mirror of
https://github.com/YunoHost-Apps/cryptpad_ynh.git
synced 2024-09-03 18:26:14 +02:00
commit
f301102e0b
1 changed files with 70 additions and 14 deletions
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@ -5,51 +5,87 @@ set $api_domain "__DOMAIN__";
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set $files_domain "__DOMAIN__";
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ssl_ecdh_curve secp384r1;
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more_set_headers "Access-Control-Allow-Origin: '${allowed_origins}'";
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more_set_headers "X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block";
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more_set_headers "X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff";
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more_set_headers "Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ${allowed_origins}";
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more_set_headers "Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true";
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# more_set_headers "X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN";
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# Enable SharedArrayBuffer in Firefox (for .xlsx export)
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more_set_headers "Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: cross-origin";
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more_set_headers "Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp";
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# Insert the path to your CryptPad repository root here
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root __INSTALL_DIR__/;
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index index.html;
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error_page 404 /customize.dist/404.html;
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# any static assets loaded with "ver=" in their URL will be cached for a year
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if ($args ~ ver=) {
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set $cacheControl max-age=31536000;
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}
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# This rule overrides the above caching directive and makes things somewhat less efficient.
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# We had inverted them as an optimization, but Safari 16 introduced a bug that interpreted
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# some important headers incorrectly when loading these files from cache.
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# This is why we can't have nice things :(
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if ($uri ~ ^(\/|.*\/|.*\.html)$) {
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set $cacheControl no-cache;
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}
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# Will not set any header if it is emptystring
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more_set_headers "Cache-Control: $cacheControl";
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# CSS can be dynamically set inline, loaded from the same domain, or from $main_domain
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set $styleSrc "'unsafe-inline' 'self' https://${main_domain}";
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# connect-src restricts URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces
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# if you have configured your instance to use a dedicated $files_domain or $api_domain
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# you will need to add them below as: https://${files_domain} and https://${api_domain}
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set $connectSrc "'self' https://${main_domain} blob: wss://${api_domain} https://${sandbox_domain}";
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# fonts can be loaded from data-URLs or the main domain
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set $fontSrc "'self' data: https://${main_domain}";
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# images can be loaded from anywhere, though we'd like to deprecate this as it allows the use of images for tracking
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set $imgSrc "'self' data: blob: https://${main_domain}";
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# frame-src specifies valid sources for nested browsing contexts.
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# this prevents loading any iframes from anywhere other than the sandbox domain
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set $frameSrc "'self' https://${sandbox_domain} blob:";
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# specifies valid sources for loading media using video or audio
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set $mediaSrc "blob:";
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# defines valid sources for webworkers and nested browser contexts
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# deprecated in favour of worker-src and frame-src
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set $childSrc "https://${main_domain}";
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# specifies valid sources for Worker, SharedWorker, or ServiceWorker scripts.
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# supercedes child-src but is unfortunately not yet universally supported.
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set $workerSrc "'self'";
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# script-src specifies valid sources for javascript, including inline handlers
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set $scriptSrc "'self' resource: https://${main_domain}";
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# frame-ancestors specifies which origins can embed your CryptPad instance
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# this must include 'self' and your main domain (over HTTPS) in order for CryptPad to work
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# if you have enabled remote embedding via the admin panel then this must be more permissive.
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# note: cryptpad.fr permits web pages served via https: and vector: (element desktop app)
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set $frameAncestors "'self' https://${main_domain}";
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# set $frameAncestors "'self' https: vector:";
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set $unsafe 0;
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# the following assets are loaded via the sandbox domain
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# they unfortunately still require exceptions to the sandboxing to work correctly.
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if ($uri ~ ^\/(sheet|doc|presentation)\/inner.html.*$) { set $unsafe 1; }
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if ($uri ~ ^\/common\/onlyoffice\/.*\/.*\.html.*$) { set $unsafe 1; }
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# everything except the sandbox domain is a privileged scope, as they might be used to handle keys
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if ($host != $sandbox_domain) { set $unsafe 0; }
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# this iframe is an exception. Office file formats are converted outside of the sandboxed scope
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# because of bugs in Chromium-based browsers that incorrectly ignore headers that are supposed to enable
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# the use of some modern APIs that we require when javascript is run in a cross-origin context.
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# We've applied other sandboxing techniques to mitigate the risk of running WebAssembly in this privileged scope
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if ($uri ~ ^\/unsafeiframe\/inner\.html.*$) { set $unsafe 1; }
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# privileged contexts allow a few more rights than unprivileged contexts, though limits are still applied
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@ -57,6 +93,7 @@ if ($unsafe) {
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set $scriptSrc "'self' 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline' resource: https://${main_domain}";
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}
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# Finally, set all the rules you composed above.
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more_set_headers "Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; child-src $childSrc; worker-src $workerSrc; media-src $mediaSrc; style-src $styleSrc; script-src $scriptSrc; connect-src $connectSrc; font-src $fontSrc; img-src $imgSrc; frame-src $frameSrc; frame-ancestors $frameAncestors";
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location ^~ /cryptpad_websocket {
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@ -74,23 +111,36 @@ location ^~ /cryptpad_websocket {
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location ^~ /customize.dist/ {
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# This is needed in order to prevent infinite recursion between /customize/ and the root
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}
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# try to load customizeable content via /customize/ and fall back to the default content
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# located at /customize.dist/
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# This is what allows you to override behaviour.
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location ^~ /customize/ {
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rewrite ^/customize/(.*)$ $1 break;
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try_files /customize/$uri /customize.dist/$uri;
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}
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# /api/config is loaded once per page load and is used to retrieve
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# the caching variable which is applied to every other resource
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# which is loaded during that session.
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location ~ ^/api/.*$ {
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proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:__PORT__;
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proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
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proxy_set_header Host $host;
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
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proxy_hide_header Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy;
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# These settings prevent both NGINX and the API server
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# from setting the same headers and creating duplicates
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proxy_hide_header "Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy";
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more_set_headers "Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: cross-origin";
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proxy_hide_header Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy;
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proxy_hide_header "Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy";
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more_set_headers "Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp";
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}
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# Requests for blobs and blocks are now proxied to the API server
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# This simplifies NGINX path configuration in the event they are being hosted in a non-standard location
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# or with odd unexpected permissions. Serving blobs in this manner also means that it will be possible to
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# enforce access control for them, though this is not yet implemented.
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# Access control (via TOTP 2FA) has been added to blocks, so they can be handled with the same directives.
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location ~ ^/(blob|block)/.*$ {
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if ($request_method = 'OPTIONS') {
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more_set_headers "Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ${allowed_origins}";
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@ -102,17 +152,23 @@ location ~ ^/(blob|block)/.*$ {
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more_set_headers "Content-Length: 0";
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return 204;
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}
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more_set_headers "X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff";
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more_set_headers "Cache-Control: max-age=31536000'";
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more_set_headers "Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ${allowed_origins}";
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more_set_headers "Access-Control-Allow-Methods: 'GET, POST, OPTIONS'";
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more_set_headers "Access-Control-Allow-Headers: DNT,X-CustomHeader,Keep-Alive,User-Agent,X-Requested-With,If-Modified-Since,Cache-Control,Content-Type,Content-Range,Range,Content-Length";
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more_set_headers "Access-Control-Expose-Headers: DNT,X-CustomHeader,Keep-Alive,User-Agent,X-Requested-With,If-Modified-Since,Cache-Control,Content-Type,Content-Range,Range,Content-Length";
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try_files $uri =404;
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# Since we are proxying to the API server these headers can get duplicated
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# so we hide them
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proxy_hide_header 'X-Content-Type-Options';
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proxy_hide_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin';
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proxy_hide_header 'Permissions-Policy';
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proxy_hide_header 'X-XSS-Protection';
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proxy_hide_header 'Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy';
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proxy_hide_header 'Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy';
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proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:__PORT__;
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}
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# The nodejs server has some built-in forwarding rules to prevent
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# URLs like /pad from resulting in a 404. This simply adds a trailing slash
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# to a variety of applications.
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location ~ ^/(register|login|recovery|settings|user|pad|drive|poll|slide|code|whiteboard|file|media|profile|contacts|todo|filepicker|debug|kanban|sheet|support|admin|notifications|teams|calendar|presentation|doc|form|report|convert|checkup|diagram)$ {
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rewrite ^(.*)$ $1/ redirect;
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}
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# Finally, serve anything the above exceptions don't govern.
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try_files /customize/www/$uri /customize/www/$uri/index.html /www/$uri /www/$uri/index.html /customize/$uri;
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