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hubzilla_ynh/sources/include/security.php

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<?php
/**
* @file include/security.php
*
* Some security related functions.
*/
/**
* @param int $user_record The account_id
* @param bool $login_initial default false
* @param bool $interactive default false
* @param bool $return
* @param bool $update_lastlog
*/
function authenticate_success($user_record, $login_initial = false, $interactive = false, $return = false, $update_lastlog = false) {
$_SESSION['addr'] = $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'];
$lastlog_updated = false;
if(x($user_record, 'account_id')) {
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App::$account = $user_record;
$_SESSION['account_id'] = $user_record['account_id'];
$_SESSION['authenticated'] = 1;
$uid_to_load = (((x($_SESSION,'uid')) && (intval($_SESSION['uid'])))
? intval($_SESSION['uid'])
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: intval(App::$account['account_default_channel'])
);
if($uid_to_load) {
change_channel($uid_to_load);
}
if($login_initial || $update_lastlog) {
q("update account set account_lastlog = '%s' where account_id = %d",
dbesc(datetime_convert()),
intval($_SESSION['account_id'])
);
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App::$account['account_lastlog'] = datetime_convert();
$lastlog_updated = true;
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call_hooks('logged_in', App::$account);
}
}
if(($login_initial) && (! $lastlog_updated)) {
call_hooks('logged_in', $user_record);
// might want to log success here
}
if($return || x($_SESSION, 'workflow')) {
unset($_SESSION['workflow']);
return;
}
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if((App::$module !== 'home') && x($_SESSION,'login_return_url') && strlen($_SESSION['login_return_url'])) {
$return_url = $_SESSION['login_return_url'];
// don't let members get redirected to a raw ajax page update - this can happen
// if DHCP changes the IP address at an unfortunate time and paranoia is turned on
if(strstr($return_url,'update_'))
$return_url = '';
unset($_SESSION['login_return_url']);
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goaway(z_root() . '/' . $return_url);
}
/* This account has never created a channel. Send them to new_channel by default */
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if(App::$module === 'login') {
$r = q("select count(channel_id) as total from channel where channel_account_id = %d and channel_removed = 0 ",
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intval(App::$account['account_id'])
);
if(($r) && (! $r[0]['total']))
goaway(z_root() . '/new_channel');
}
/* else just return */
}
/**
* @brief Change to another channel with current logged-in account.
*
* @param int $change_channel The channel_id of the channel you want to change to
*
* @return bool|array false or channel record of the new channel
*/
function change_channel($change_channel) {
$ret = false;
if($change_channel) {
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$r = q("select channel.*, xchan.* from channel left join xchan on channel.channel_hash = xchan.xchan_hash where channel_id = %d and channel_account_id = %d and channel_removed = 0 limit 1",
intval($change_channel),
intval(get_account_id())
);
// It's not there. Is this an administrator, and is this the sys channel?
if (is_developer()) {
if (! $r) {
if (is_site_admin()) {
$r = q("select channel.*, xchan.* from channel left join xchan on channel.channel_hash = xchan.xchan_hash where channel_id = %d and channel_system = 1 and channel_removed = 0 limit 1",
intval($change_channel)
);
}
}
}
if($r) {
$hash = $r[0]['channel_hash'];
$_SESSION['uid'] = intval($r[0]['channel_id']);
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App::set_channel($r[0]);
$_SESSION['theme'] = $r[0]['channel_theme'];
$_SESSION['mobile_theme'] = get_pconfig(local_channel(),'system', 'mobile_theme');
date_default_timezone_set($r[0]['channel_timezone']);
$ret = $r[0];
}
$x = q("select * from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' limit 1",
dbesc($hash)
);
if($x) {
$_SESSION['my_url'] = $x[0]['xchan_url'];
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$_SESSION['my_address'] = $r[0]['channel_address'] . '@' . substr(z_root(), strpos(z_root(), '://') + 3);
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App::set_observer($x[0]);
App::set_perms(get_all_perms(local_channel(), $hash));
}
if(! is_dir('store/' . $r[0]['channel_address']))
@os_mkdir('store/' . $r[0]['channel_address'], STORAGE_DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS,true);
}
return $ret;
}
/**
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* @brief Creates an additional SQL where statement to check permissions.
*
* @param int $owner_id
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* @param bool $remote_observer - if unset use current observer
*
* @return string additional SQL where statement
*/
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function permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null, $table = '') {
$local_channel = local_channel();
/**
* Construct permissions
*
* default permissions - anonymous user
*/
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if($table)
$table .= '.';
$sql = " AND {$table}allow_cid = ''
AND {$table}allow_gid = ''
AND {$table}deny_cid = ''
AND {$table}deny_gid = ''
";
/**
* Profile owner - everything is visible
*/
if(($local_channel) && ($local_channel == $owner_id)) {
$sql = '';
}
/**
* Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified,
* check that the contact belongs to this $owner_id
* and load the groups the visitor belongs to.
* If pre-verified, the caller is expected to have already
* done this and passed the groups into this function.
*/
else {
$observer = ((! is_null($remote_observer)) ? $remote_observer : get_observer_hash());
if($observer) {
$groups = init_groups_visitor($observer);
$gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) {
foreach($groups as $g)
$gs .= '|<' . $g . '>';
}
$regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP');
$sql = sprintf(
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" AND ( NOT ({$table}deny_cid like '%s' OR {$table}deny_gid $regexop '%s')
AND ( {$table}allow_cid like '%s' OR {$table}allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( {$table}allow_cid = '' AND {$table}allow_gid = '') )
)
",
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')),
dbesc($gs),
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')),
dbesc($gs)
);
}
}
return $sql;
}
/**
* @brief Creates an addiontal SQL where statement to check permissions for an item.
*
* @param int $owner_id
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* @param bool $remote_observer, use current observer if unset
*
* @return string additional SQL where statement
*/
function item_permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null) {
$local_channel = local_channel();
/**
* Construct permissions
*
* default permissions - anonymous user
*/
$sql = " AND item_private = 0 ";
/**
* Profile owner - everything is visible
*/
if(($local_channel) && ($local_channel == $owner_id)) {
$sql = '';
}
/**
* Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified,
* check that the contact belongs to this $owner_id
* and load the groups the visitor belongs to.
* If pre-verified, the caller is expected to have already
* done this and passed the groups into this function.
*/
else {
$observer = (($remote_observer) ? $remote_observer : get_observer_hash());
if($observer) {
$s = scopes_sql($owner_id,$observer);
$groups = init_groups_visitor($observer);
$gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) {
foreach($groups as $g)
$gs .= '|<' . $g . '>';
}
$regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP');
$sql = sprintf(
" AND (( NOT (deny_cid like '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s')
AND ( allow_cid like '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '' AND item_private = 0 ))
) OR ( item_private = 1 $s ))
",
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')),
dbesc($gs),
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')),
dbesc($gs)
);
}
}
return $sql;
}
/**
* Remote visitors also need to be checked against the public_scope parameter if item_private is set.
* This function checks the various permutations of that field for any which apply to this observer.
*
*/
function scopes_sql($uid,$observer) {
$str = " and ( public_policy = 'authenticated' ";
if(! is_foreigner($observer))
$str .= " or public_policy = 'network: red' ";
if(local_channel())
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$str .= " or public_policy = 'site: " . App::get_hostname() . "' ";
$ab = q("select * from abook where abook_xchan = '%s' and abook_channel = %d limit 1",
dbesc($observer),
intval($uid)
);
if(! $ab)
return $str . " ) ";
if($ab[0]['abook_pending'])
$str .= " or public_policy = 'any connections' ";
$str .= " or public_policy = 'contacts' ) ";
return $str;
}
/**
* @param string $observer_hash
*
* @return string additional SQL where statement
*/
function public_permissions_sql($observer_hash) {
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//$observer = App::get_observer();
$groups = init_groups_visitor($observer_hash);
$gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) {
foreach($groups as $g)
$gs .= '|<' . $g . '>';
}
$sql = '';
if($observer_hash) {
$regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP');
$sql = sprintf(
" OR (( NOT (deny_cid like '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s')
AND ( allow_cid like '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '' AND item_private = 0 ) )
))
",
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer_hash . '>%')),
dbesc($gs),
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer_hash . '>%')),
dbesc($gs)
);
}
return $sql;
}
/*
* Functions used to protect against Cross-Site Request Forgery
* The security token has to base on at least one value that an attacker can't know - here it's the session ID and the private key.
* In this implementation, a security token is reusable (if the user submits a form, goes back and resubmits the form, maybe with small changes;
* or if the security token is used for ajax-calls that happen several times), but only valid for a certain amout of time (3hours).
* The "typename" seperates the security tokens of different types of forms. This could be relevant in the following case:
* A security token is used to protekt a link from CSRF (e.g. the "delete this profile"-link).
* If the new page contains by any chance external elements, then the used security token is exposed by the referrer.
* Actually, important actions should not be triggered by Links / GET-Requests at all, but somethimes they still are,
* so this mechanism brings in some damage control (the attacker would be able to forge a request to a form of this type, but not to forms of other types).
*/
function get_form_security_token($typename = '') {
$timestamp = time();
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$sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', App::$observer['xchan_guid'] . ((local_channel()) ? App::$channel['channel_prvkey'] : '') . session_id() . $timestamp . $typename);
return $timestamp . '.' . $sec_hash;
}
function check_form_security_token($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') {
if (!x($_REQUEST, $formname)) return false;
$hash = $_REQUEST[$formname];
$max_livetime = 10800; // 3 hours
$x = explode('.', $hash);
if (time() > (IntVal($x[0]) + $max_livetime)) return false;
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$sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', App::$observer['xchan_guid'] . ((local_channel()) ? App::$channel['channel_prvkey'] : '') . session_id() . $x[0] . $typename);
return ($sec_hash == $x[1]);
}
function check_form_security_std_err_msg() {
return t('The form security token was not correct. This probably happened because the form has been opened for too long (>3 hours) before submitting it.') . EOL;
}
function check_form_security_token_redirectOnErr($err_redirect, $typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') {
if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) {
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logger('check_form_security_token failed: user ' . App::$observer['xchan_name'] . ' - form element ' . $typename);
logger('check_form_security_token failed: _REQUEST data: ' . print_r($_REQUEST, true), LOGGER_DATA);
notice( check_form_security_std_err_msg() );
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goaway(z_root() . $err_redirect );
}
}
function check_form_security_token_ForbiddenOnErr($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') {
if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) {
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logger('check_form_security_token failed: user ' . App::$observer['xchan_name'] . ' - form element ' . $typename);
logger('check_form_security_token failed: _REQUEST data: ' . print_r($_REQUEST, true), LOGGER_DATA);
header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden');
killme();
}
}
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// Returns an array of group hash id's on this entire site (across all channels) that this connection is a member of.
// var $contact_id = xchan_hash of connection
function init_groups_visitor($contact_id) {
$groups = array();
$r = q("SELECT hash FROM `groups` left join group_member on groups.id = group_member.gid WHERE xchan = '%s' ",
dbesc($contact_id)
);
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if($r) {
foreach($r as $rr)
$groups[] = $rr['hash'];
}
return $groups;
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}
// This is used to determine which uid have posts which are visible to the logged in user (from the API) for the
// public_timeline, and we can use this in a community page by making
// $perms = (PERMS_NETWORK|PERMS_PUBLIC) unless logged in.
// Collect uids of everybody on this site who has opened their posts to everybody on this site (or greater visibility)
// We always include yourself if logged in because you can always see your own posts
// resolving granular permissions for the observer against every person and every post on the site
// will likely be too expensive.
// Returns a string list of comma separated channel_ids suitable for direct inclusion in a SQL query
function stream_perms_api_uids($perms = NULL, $limit = 0, $rand = 0 ) {
$perms = is_null($perms) ? (PERMS_SITE|PERMS_NETWORK|PERMS_PUBLIC) : $perms;
$ret = array();
$limit_sql = (($limit) ? " LIMIT " . intval($limit) . " " : '');
$random_sql = (($rand) ? " ORDER BY " . db_getfunc('RAND') . " " : '');
if(local_channel())
$ret[] = local_channel();
$r = q("select channel_id from channel where channel_r_stream > 0 and ( channel_r_stream & %d )>0 and ( channel_pageflags & %d ) = 0 and channel_system = 0 and channel_removed = 0 $random_sql $limit_sql ",
intval($perms),
intval(PAGE_ADULT|PAGE_CENSORED)
);
if($r) {
foreach($r as $rr)
if(! in_array($rr['channel_id'], $ret))
$ret[] = $rr['channel_id'];
}
$str = '';
if($ret) {
foreach($ret as $rr) {
if($str)
$str .= ',';
$str .= intval($rr);
}
}
else
$str = "''";
logger('stream_perms_api_uids: ' . $str, LOGGER_DEBUG);
return $str;
}
function stream_perms_xchans($perms = NULL ) {
$perms = is_null($perms) ? (PERMS_SITE|PERMS_NETWORK|PERMS_PUBLIC) : $perms;
$ret = array();
if(local_channel())
$ret[] = get_observer_hash();
$r = q("select channel_hash from channel where channel_r_stream > 0 and (channel_r_stream & %d)>0 and not (channel_pageflags & %d)>0 and channel_system = 0 and channel_removed = 0 ",
intval($perms),
intval(PAGE_ADULT|PAGE_CENSORED)
);
if($r) {
foreach($r as $rr)
if(! in_array($rr['channel_hash'], $ret))
$ret[] = $rr['channel_hash'];
}
$str = '';
if($ret) {
foreach($ret as $rr) {
if($str)
$str .= ',';
$str .= "'" . dbesc($rr) . "'";
}
}
else
$str = "''";
logger('stream_perms_xchans: ' . $str, LOGGER_DEBUG);
return $str;
}