[Unit]
Description=Matrix sliding proxy
After=network.target

#
# Big fat warning
#

# This unit file MUST be reworked completly when we will be on debian bookworm
# To make it working on debian bullseye many workaround was many, mainly chroot
# So mainly this unit should be completly reworkd and cleaned since we dropt debian bullseye support


[Service]
Type=simple
User=__APP__
# WorkingDirectory=/opt/yunohost/matrix-__APP__
EnvironmentFile=/etc/matrix-__APP__/sliding_proxy.conf
ExecStart=/bin/sliding-proxy
Restart=always
RestartSec=3
RootDirectory=/opt/yunohost/matrix-__APP__/sliding-chroot
BindReadOnlyPaths=/etc
BindReadOnlyPaths=/usr/share/ca-certificates

# Sandboxing options to harden security
# Details for these options: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.exec.html
NoNewPrivileges=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
PrivateDevices=yes
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_NETLINK
RestrictNamespaces=yes
RestrictRealtime=yes
DevicePolicy=closed
ProtectClock=yes
ProtectHostname=yes
ProtectProc=invisible
ProtectSystem=full
ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
LockPersonality=yes
SystemCallArchitectures=native
# SystemCallFilter=~@clock @debug @module @mount @obsolete @reboot @setuid @swap @cpu-emulation @privileged

# Denying access to capabilities that should not be relevant for webapps
# Doc: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_RAWIO CAP_MKNOD
CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL CAP_AUDIT_READ CAP_AUDIT_WRITE
CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_SYS_BOOT CAP_SYS_TIME CAP_SYS_MODULE CAP_SYS_PACCT
CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_LEASE CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE CAP_IPC_LOCK
CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND CAP_WAKE_ALARM
CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_MAC_ADMIN CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE
CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_BROADCAST CAP_NET_RAW
CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_SYS_ADMIN CAP_SYS_PTRACE CAP_SYSLOG

[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target