2013-10-15 13:58:16 +02:00
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--
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2015-02-02 00:05:09 +01:00
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-- access.lua
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--
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-- This file is executed at every request on a protected domain or server.
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2013-10-15 13:58:16 +02:00
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--
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2014-04-10 20:42:43 +02:00
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2015-02-02 00:05:09 +01:00
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-- Just a note for the client to know that he passed through the SSO
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2013-10-16 11:57:53 +02:00
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ngx.header["X-SSO-WAT"] = "You've just been SSOed"
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2013-10-15 10:11:39 +02:00
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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-- Misc imports
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local jwt = require("vendor.luajwtjitsi.luajwtjitsi")
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2023-12-23 20:08:35 +01:00
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-- local cipher = require('openssl.cipher')
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2023-09-27 18:49:28 +02:00
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local rex = require("rex_pcre2")
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2023-11-28 18:04:29 +01:00
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local lfs = require("lfs")
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2015-02-15 12:31:23 +01:00
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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-- ###########################################################################
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-- 0. Misc helpers because Lua has no sugar ...
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-- ###########################################################################
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-- Get configuration (we do this here, the conf is re-read every time unless
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-- the file's timestamp didnt change)
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local config = require("config")
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local conf = config.get_config()
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2023-09-02 19:36:18 +02:00
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-- Cache expensive calculations
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local cache = ngx.shared.cache
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-- Hash a string using hmac_sha512, return a hexa string
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2023-09-27 18:43:13 +02:00
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function cached_jwt_verify(data, secret)
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2023-09-02 19:36:18 +02:00
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res = cache:get(data)
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if res == nil then
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logger:debug("Result not found in cache, checking login")
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-- Perform expensive calculation
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decoded, err = jwt.verify(data, "HS256", cookie_secret)
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if not decoded then
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logger:error(err)
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2023-11-28 19:57:57 +01:00
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return nil, nil, nil, nil, err
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2023-09-02 19:36:18 +02:00
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end
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-- As explained in set_basic_auth_header(), user and hashed password do not contain ':'
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2023-11-28 18:04:29 +01:00
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-- And cache cannot contain tables, so we use "id:user:password" format
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2023-11-28 19:57:57 +01:00
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cached = decoded['id']..":"..decoded['host']..":"..decoded["user"]..":"..decoded["pwd"]
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2023-09-02 19:36:18 +02:00
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cache:set(data, cached, 120)
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logger:debug("Result saved in cache")
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2023-11-28 19:57:57 +01:00
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return decoded['id'], decoded['host'], decoded["user"], decoded["pwd"], err
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2023-09-02 19:36:18 +02:00
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else
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logger:debug("Result found in cache")
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2023-11-28 19:57:57 +01:00
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session_id, host, user, pwd = res:match("([^:]+):([^:]+):([^:]+):(.*)")
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return session_id, host, user, pwd, nil
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2023-09-02 19:36:18 +02:00
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end
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end
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2023-11-28 19:57:57 +01:00
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-- Test whether a string starts/ends with something
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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function string.starts(String, Start)
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if not String then
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return false
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end
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return string.sub(String, 1, string.len(Start)) == Start
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end
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2023-11-28 19:57:57 +01:00
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function string.ends(String, End)
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if not String then
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return false
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end
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return string.sub(String, -string.len(End)) == End
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end
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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-- Convert a table of arguments to an URI string
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function uri_args_string(args)
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if not args then
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args = ngx.req.get_uri_args()
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end
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String = "?"
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for k,v in pairs(args) do
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String = String..tostring(k).."="..tostring(v).."&"
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end
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return string.sub(String, 1, string.len(String) - 1)
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end
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2023-09-29 14:30:36 +02:00
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function element_is_in_table(element, table)
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if table then
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for _, el in pairs(table) do
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if el == element then
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return true
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end
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end
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end
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return false
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end
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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-- ###########################################################################
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-- 1. AUTHENTICATION
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-- Check wether or not this is a logged-in user
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2023-09-02 19:36:18 +02:00
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-- This is not run immediately but only if:
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-- - the app is not public
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-- - and/or auth_headers is enabled for this app
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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-- ###########################################################################
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function check_authentication()
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-- cf. src/authenticators/ldap_ynhuser.py in YunoHost to see how the cookie is actually created
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local cookie = ngx.var["cookie_" .. conf["cookie_name"]]
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2023-10-03 20:30:59 +02:00
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if cookie == nil or cookie_secret == nil then
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2023-09-02 19:36:18 +02:00
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return false, nil, nil
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end
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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2023-11-28 19:57:57 +01:00
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session_id, host, user, pwd, err = cached_jwt_verify(cookie, cookie_secret)
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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if err ~= nil then
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return false, nil, nil
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end
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2023-11-28 18:04:29 +01:00
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local session_file = conf["session_folder"] .. '/' .. session_id
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local session_file_attrs = lfs.attributes(session_file, {"modification"})
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2023-11-28 18:13:12 +01:00
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if session_file_attrs == nil or math.abs(session_file_attrs["modification"] - os.time()) > 3 * 24 * 3600 then
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2023-11-28 18:04:29 +01:00
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-- session expired
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return false, nil, nil
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end
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2023-11-28 19:57:57 +01:00
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-- Check the host the cookie was meant to does match the request
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-- (this should never happen except if somehow a malicious user manually tries
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-- to use a cookie that was delivered from a different domain)
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2024-01-30 19:05:56 +01:00
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if host ~= ngx.var.host and not string.ends(ngx.var.host, "." .. host) then
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2023-11-28 19:57:57 +01:00
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return false, nil, nil
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end
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2023-11-28 18:04:29 +01:00
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return true, user, pwd
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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end
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-- ###########################################################################
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-- 2. REDIRECTED URLS
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-- If the URL matches one of the `redirected_urls` in the configuration file,
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-- just redirect to the target URL/URI
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-- ###########################################################################
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function convert_to_absolute_url(redirect_url)
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if string.starts(redirect_url, "http://")
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or string.starts(redirect_url, "https://") then
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return redirect_url
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elseif string.starts(redirect_url, "/") then
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return ngx.var.scheme.."://"..ngx.var.host..redirect_url
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2014-04-10 17:35:28 +02:00
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else
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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return ngx.var.scheme.."://"..redirect_url
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2014-04-10 17:35:28 +02:00
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end
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end
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if conf["redirected_urls"] then
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for url, redirect_url in pairs(conf["redirected_urls"]) do
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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if url == ngx.var.host..ngx.var.uri..uri_args_string()
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or url == ngx.var.scheme.."://"..ngx.var.host..ngx.var.uri..uri_args_string()
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or url == ngx.var.uri..uri_args_string() then
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2023-07-15 21:22:27 +02:00
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logger:debug("Found in redirected_urls, redirecting to "..url)
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ngx.redirect(convert_to_absolute_url(redirect_url))
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2014-04-10 17:35:28 +02:00
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end
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end
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end
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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-- ###########################################################################
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-- 3. IDENTIFY PERMISSION MATCHING THE REQUESTED URL
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2020-05-21 21:53:04 +02:00
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--
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2020-09-20 17:57:23 +02:00
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-- In particular, the conf is filled with permissions such as:
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2020-05-21 21:53:04 +02:00
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--
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2020-09-20 17:57:23 +02:00
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-- "foobar": {
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-- "auth_header": false,
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-- "public": false,
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-- "uris": [
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-- "yolo.test/foobar",
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-- "re:^[^/]*/%.well%-known/foobar/.*$",
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-- ],
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-- "users": ["alice", "bob"]
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-- }
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--
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--
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-- And we find the best matching permission by trying to match the request uri
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-- against all the uris rules/regexes from the conf and keep the longest matching one.
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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-- ###########################################################################
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2020-05-21 21:53:04 +02:00
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2020-09-20 17:57:23 +02:00
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permission = nil
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2023-12-23 20:39:07 +01:00
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longest_match = ""
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2020-05-21 22:56:52 +02:00
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2021-01-20 01:28:08 +01:00
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ngx_full_url = ngx.var.host..ngx.var.uri
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2020-09-20 17:57:23 +02:00
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for permission_name, permission_infos in pairs(conf["permissions"]) do
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if next(permission_infos['uris']) ~= nil then
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2023-12-23 20:39:07 +01:00
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for _, prefix in pairs(permission_infos['uris']) do
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local match = nil
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if string.starts(prefix, "re:") then
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prefix = string.sub(prefix, 4, string.len(prefix))
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-- Make sure we match the prefix from the beginning of the url
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if not string.starts(prefix, "^") then
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prefix = "^"..prefix
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end
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match = rex.match(ngx_full_url, prefix)
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elseif string.starts(ngx_full_url, prefix) then
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match = prefix
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2021-01-20 01:28:08 +01:00
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end
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2020-05-21 22:56:52 +02:00
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2023-12-23 20:39:07 +01:00
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if match ~= nil and string.len(match) > string.len(longest_match) then
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longest_match = match
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2020-09-20 17:57:23 +02:00
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permission = permission_infos
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permission["id"] = permission_name
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end
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end
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end
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end
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2020-05-21 21:53:04 +02:00
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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-- ###########################################################################
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-- 4. CHECK USER HAS ACCESS
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-- Either because the permission is set as "public: true",
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-- Or because the logged-in user is listed in the "users" list of the perm
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-- ###########################################################################
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2023-09-29 14:30:14 +02:00
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-- No permission object found = no access
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if permission == nil then
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logger:debug("No permission matching request for "..ngx.var.uri.." ... Assuming access is denied")
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has_access = false
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-- permission is public = everybody has access, no need to check auth
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elseif permission["public"] then
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logger:debug("Someone tries to access "..ngx.var.uri.." (corresponding perm: "..permission["id"]..")")
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has_access = true
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-- Check auth header, assume the route is protected
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else
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is_logged_in, authUser, authPasswordEnc = check_authentication()
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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2023-09-29 14:30:14 +02:00
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-- Unauthenticated user, deny access
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if authUser == nil then
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logger:debug("Denied unauthenticated access to "..ngx.var.uri.." (corresponding perm: "..permission["id"]..")")
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2023-11-28 19:26:03 +01:00
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has_access = false
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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else
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2023-09-29 14:30:14 +02:00
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logger:debug("User "..authUser.." tries to access "..ngx.var.uri.." (corresponding perm: "..permission["id"]..")")
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2023-11-28 19:26:03 +01:00
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-- The user has permission to access the content if s.he is in the list of allowed users
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if element_is_in_table(authUser, permission["users"]) then
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logger:debug("User "..authUser.." can access "..ngx.var.host..ngx.var.uri..uri_args_string())
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has_access = true
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else
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logger:debug("User "..authUser.." cannot access "..ngx.var.uri)
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has_access = false
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end
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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end
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end
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-- ###########################################################################
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-- 5. CLEAR USER-PROVIDED AUTH HEADER
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2020-05-21 21:53:04 +02:00
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--
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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-- Which could be spoofing attempts
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2017-04-02 23:47:54 +02:00
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--
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2024-01-30 19:35:47 +01:00
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-- Apps can opt out of the auth spoofing protection using the setting
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-- 'protect_against_basic_auth_spoofing' set to false if they really need to,
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-- but that's a huge security hole and ultimately should never be done...
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--
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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-- ###########################################################################
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if permission ~= nil and ngx.req.get_headers()["Authorization"] ~= nil then
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2024-01-30 19:35:47 +01:00
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if permission["protect_against_basic_auth_spoofing"] == false then
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2023-09-02 19:36:18 +02:00
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-- Ignore if not a Basic auth header
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-- otherwise, we interpret this as a Auth header spoofing attempt and clear it
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local auth_header_from_client = ngx.req.get_headers()["Authorization"]
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_, _, b64_cred = string.find(auth_header_from_client, "^Basic%s+(.+)$")
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if b64_cred ~= nil then
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ngx.req.clear_header("Authorization")
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end
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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end
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end
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-- ###########################################################################
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-- 6. EFFECTIVELY PASS OR DENY ACCESS
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2017-04-02 23:47:54 +02:00
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--
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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-- If the user has access (either because app is public OR logged in + authorized)
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-- -> pass + possibly inject the Basic Auth header on the fly such that the app can know which user is logged in
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2017-04-02 23:47:54 +02:00
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--
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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-- Otherwise, the user can't access
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-- -> either because not logged in at all, in that case, redirect to the portal WITH a callback url to redirect to after logging in
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-- -> or because user is logged in, but has no access .. in that case just redirect to the portal
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-- ###########################################################################
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2017-04-02 23:47:54 +02:00
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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function set_basic_auth_header()
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-- cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basic_access_authentication
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2017-04-02 23:47:54 +02:00
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2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
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-- authPasswordEnc is actually a string formatted as <password_enc_b64>|<iv_b64>
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-- For example: ctl8kk5GevYdaA5VZ2S88Q==|yTAzCx0Gd1+MCit4EQl9lA==
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-- The password is encoded using AES-256-CBC with the IV being the right-side data
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-- cf. src/authenticators/ldap_ynhuser.py in YunoHost to see how the cookie is actually created
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2023-12-23 20:08:35 +01:00
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-- Tmp, possibly permanent removal of the code that inject the password inside the auth header,
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-- which should not be needed in the vast majority of cases where the app just trust the $remote_user info/header ...
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-- local password_enc_b64, iv_b64 = authPasswordEnc:match("([^|]+)|([^|]+)")
|
|
|
|
-- local password_enc = ngx.decode_base64(password_enc_b64)
|
|
|
|
-- local iv = ngx.decode_base64(iv_b64)
|
|
|
|
-- local password = cipher.new('aes-256-cbc'):decrypt(cookie_secret, iv):final(password_enc)
|
2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-- Set `Authorization` header to enable HTTP authentification
|
|
|
|
ngx.req.set_header("Authorization", "Basic "..ngx.encode_base64(
|
2024-01-30 17:44:26 +01:00
|
|
|
authUser..":-"
|
2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
|
|
|
))
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-- 1st case : client has access
|
|
|
|
if has_access then
|
2023-09-02 19:36:18 +02:00
|
|
|
-- If Basic Authorization header are enable for this permission,
|
|
|
|
-- check if the user is actually logged in...
|
|
|
|
if permission["auth_header"] then
|
|
|
|
if is_logged_in == nil then
|
|
|
|
-- Login check was not performed yet because the app is public
|
|
|
|
logger:debug("Checking authentication because the app requires auth_header")
|
|
|
|
is_logged_in, authUser, authPasswordEnc = check_authentication()
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
if is_logged_in then
|
|
|
|
-- add it to the response
|
2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
|
|
|
set_basic_auth_header()
|
2020-04-01 00:43:59 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
|
2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
|
|
|
-- Pass
|
|
|
|
logger:debug("Allowing to pass through "..ngx.var.uri)
|
|
|
|
return
|
2013-10-20 17:24:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2020-09-20 18:00:37 +02:00
|
|
|
-- 2nd case : no access ... redirect to portal / login form
|
2020-05-21 21:51:55 +02:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
2023-08-13 18:17:52 +02:00
|
|
|
portal_domain = conf["domain_portal_urls"][ngx.var.host]
|
|
|
|
if portal_domain == nil then
|
2023-09-29 14:31:30 +02:00
|
|
|
logger:debug("Domain " .. ngx.var.host .. " is not configured for SSOWat, falling back to default")
|
|
|
|
portal_domain = conf["domain_portal_urls"]["default"]
|
|
|
|
if portal_domain ~= nil then
|
2023-11-28 19:26:03 +01:00
|
|
|
if string.starts(portal_domain, '/') then
|
|
|
|
portal_domain = ngx.var.host .. portal_domain
|
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
return ngx.redirect("https://" .. portal_domain)
|
|
|
|
end
|
2023-09-29 14:31:30 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
if portal_domain == nil then
|
2023-11-28 19:26:03 +01:00
|
|
|
ngx.header['Content-Type'] = "text/html"
|
|
|
|
ngx.status = 400
|
|
|
|
ngx.say("Unmanaged domain")
|
|
|
|
return ngx.exit(200)
|
2023-08-13 18:17:52 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
2023-09-29 14:31:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2023-08-13 18:17:52 +02:00
|
|
|
portal_url = "https://" .. portal_domain
|
|
|
|
logger:debug("Redirecting to portal : " .. portal_url)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if is_logged_in then
|
2023-11-28 19:59:13 +01:00
|
|
|
return ngx.redirect(portal_url.."?msg=access_denied")
|
2020-09-20 18:00:37 +02:00
|
|
|
else
|
2023-07-15 19:51:31 +02:00
|
|
|
local back_url = "https://" .. ngx.var.host .. ngx.var.uri .. uri_args_string()
|
2023-07-15 21:22:27 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-- User ain't logged in, redirect to the portal where we expect the user to login,
|
|
|
|
-- then be redirected to the original URL by the portal, encoded as base64
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
|
|
-- NB. for security reason, the client/app handling the callback should check
|
|
|
|
-- that the back URL is legit, i.e it should be on the same domain (or a subdomain)
|
|
|
|
-- than the portal. Otherwise, a malicious actor could create a deceptive link
|
|
|
|
-- that would in fact redirect to a different domain, tricking the user that may
|
|
|
|
-- not realize this.
|
|
|
|
return ngx.redirect(portal_url.."?r="..ngx.encode_base64(back_url))
|
2020-09-20 18:00:37 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|
2020-05-21 21:51:55 +02:00
|
|
|
end
|